The constitution belongs to the people, and Zimbabweans must reject a backdoor presidency

It is dangerous when power rewrites the people’s Constitution.

A constitution is the covenant between the people and those who govern, designed to restrain ambition, safeguard citizens, and ensure that leadership is earned, not seized or extended at will.

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Zimbabwe now faces a direct assault on that covenant.

Justice Minister Ziyambi Ziyambi’s memorandum proposing constitutional amendments is being sold as reform, stability, and efficiency.

In reality, it is a roadmap to allow President Emmerson Mnangagwa to remain in office beyond the legal limit imposed by the 2013 Constitution, despite his second and final term being set to expire in 2028.

At the heart of the memorandum are two measures that strike at the foundation of democracy: extending presidential and parliamentary terms from five to seven years, and replacing the people’s direct vote with a parliamentary selection.

These changes are framed as reducing “disruptions” and ensuring “policy continuity,” but they are anything but neutral.

Section 328(7) of the Constitution explicitly prevents incumbents from benefiting from term extensions.

Any maneuver to allow Mnangagwa to exploit a longer term would directly contravene the law.

Courts, if independent, would have clear legal grounds to strike down such amendments.

This is law, not theory.

Even more alarming is the proposal to have Parliament elect the President.

Zimbabweans have long exercised the direct vote as the ultimate expression of sovereignty.

Handing this power to a small group of legislators is a tacit admission that Mnangagwa cannot command genuine popular support.

Why else would the government bypass the people entirely?

The reality is stark: the majority of Zimbabweans, enduring widespread poverty affecting nearly 80% of the population, high unemployment, collapsing industries, and unreliable electricity supply, may no longer want him in office.

Parliament cannot substitute for the consent of the governed.

Any attempt to do so is not constitutional evolution; it is constitutional subversion.

The memorandum argues that longer terms and parliamentary selection are necessary to ensure national development and policy continuity.

This is a dangerous fiction.

Zimbabweans know the truth from bitter experience.

Under Robert Mugabe’s 37 years of uninterrupted rule, the country witnessed economic collapse, culminating in hyperinflation peaking at 79.6 billion percent in 2008, a collapsing industrial base, food insecurity, and the mismanagement of public institutions.

Continuity under Mugabe did not deliver development; it produced systemic failure.

Yoweri Museveni in Uganda removed presidential term limits and extended his rule for decades.

The result has been entrenched patronage, hollowed-out institutions, and uneven development.

Angola, under Jose Eduardo dos Santos for 38 years, saw oil wealth captured by elites while ordinary citizens suffered from infrastructure decay and poverty.

These examples are warnings: continuity without accountability is a recipe for stagnation, corruption, and national decline, not growth.

By contrast, countries that respect term limits and maintain strong institutions demonstrate that development depends on governance, not personal longevity.

Botswana has held regular elections since independence in 1966, respecting term limits and building strong institutions.

Responsible management of diamond revenues, stable macroeconomic policies, and effective public service delivery have made it one of Africa’s most consistently prosperous countries.

Ghana transitioned from authoritarian rule in the 1990s to a functioning democracy, respecting term limits and holding regular elections.

The country now enjoys sustained economic growth, expanding education and infrastructure, and a vibrant civil society.

These examples refute the claim that longer presidential terms or backdoor appointments are prerequisites for national development.

Section 3 of Zimbabwe’s Constitution enshrines democracy, the rule of law, and political accountability as founding principles.

Removing the people’s direct vote for President undermines these principles and weakens the moral authority of the state itself.

Legally, such a change would require a national referendum because it fundamentally alters the structure of government and the relationship between citizens and their leadership.

Attempting to bypass this requirement exposes the amendments to constitutional challenge.

Even if Parliament follows technical amendment rules, imposing a leader on a population that may reject him is illegitimate in both law and spirit.

The memorandum frames these amendments as aligning Zimbabwe with “contemporary African constitutional models.”

This is misleading.

Parliamentary systems work in Africa only where the political, electoral, and party architecture is designed to support them, creating legitimacy through rules, proportional representation, and accountability.

Take South Africa, where the President is elected by the National Assembly.

This works because the Assembly is elected through a proportional representation system, meaning the citizens’ votes directly determine party strength in Parliament, and, by extension, the head of state.

Similarly, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister is appointed by a parliamentary majority, but the federal structure and party system ensure that leadership reflects the electorate’s will across diverse regions.

Namibia also uses a parliamentary system in which the President is chosen by the National Assembly, itself elected through proportional representation, ensuring that leadership derives from voter choices rather than elite maneuvering.

Zimbabwe’s Constitution, by contrast, is presidential by design. Sections 80–92 anchor the President’s legitimacy in direct popular vote, not in parliamentary arithmetic.

There are no strong proportional representation mechanisms, no coalition rules, and Parliament was never intended to impose a leader on citizens.

Attempting to transplant parliamentary-style election without the supporting architecture is not reform—it is opportunism, a way to bypass the people while pretending to follow a constitutional process.

This move would effectively strip citizens of their primary constitutional right to choose the President, replacing it with a mechanism designed solely to entrench an unpopular leader.

In other words, the memorandum does not modernize Zimbabwe’s Constitution; it subverts it.

The proposals also violate the anti-self-dealing principle, a cornerstone of constitutional ethics.

Leaders are not allowed to rewrite rules to serve their own survival.

Courts around the world consistently hold that amendments designed primarily to entrench incumbency are contrary to the spirit of constitutional governance.

Zimbabwean judges, if independent, would have ample grounds to scrutinize both the intent and effect of these amendments.

The political consequences are equally dangerous.

The people of Zimbabwe are not afraid of elections; they are afraid that their votes may no longer matter.

Undermining direct presidential elections and extending terms through backdoor mechanisms risks creating a permanent cycle of cynicism, disillusionment, and disengagement.

Concentrating political power only compounds these hardships.

Proponents argue that longer terms and parliamentary selection allow national development projects to be completed.

This is hollow.

Policy continuity does not depend on term length; it depends on competent, accountable governance.

Democracies worldwide implement long-term projects while holding elections on schedule.

Elections are not interruptions—they are mechanisms for citizens to hold leaders accountable.

If elections feel inconvenient, it is because those in power fear judgment, not because the nation cannot govern.

The memorandum’s proposals, under the guise of reform, are a naked attempt to consolidate power at the expense of the people.

Zimbabweans deserve a government that earns legitimacy through persuasion, competence, and service—not procedural manipulation.

Attempts to impose unpopular leadership through constitutional sleight of hand betray the nation, violate citizens’ trust, and threaten democracy itself.

The choice before Zimbabwe is stark.

The nation can uphold the Constitution as a shield for citizens, protecting democratic norms and popular sovereignty.

Or it can bend the law into a tool for political survival.

Stability, continuity, and development cannot be achieved through constitutional subversion.

They are achieved through respect for the rule of law, honoring the popular mandate, and governing in a way that earns, rather than circumvents, consent.

This is not an abstract debate—it is about the future of Zimbabwe.

Any reform that prioritizes political survival over popular sovereignty undermines the Constitution, the people, and the nation itself.

Zimbabweans must refuse a backdoor presidency.

Democracy is not a privilege for the powerful; it is the right of every citizen, and it cannot be negotiated away for the convenience of one man.

The Constitution belongs to the people, not the government of the day.

It exists to restrain power, guarantee accountability, and ensure that leadership remains conditional on popular consent.

Attempts to extend terms or impose leaders against the will of the people are a betrayal of the nation, an affront to democracy, and a call to principled resistance.

Zimbabweans now face a choice: uphold the Constitution or allow power to rewrite the rules for its own survival.

The answer will define the country’s democratic future for generations.

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