And so the constitutional mutilation machinations continue.
The ruling ZANU-PF party’s admission that it has “recalibrated” its controversial 2030 agenda after failing to gazette proposed constitutional amendments by the promised 31 December 2025 deadline is more than a procedural hiccup.
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It is a telling indication that President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s path to extending his stay in office beyond 2028 is fraught with serious legal obstacles, political miscalculations, and potentially destabilising dangers — some of them emanating from within his own camp.
At the centre of this debate is a fundamental constitutional question that Mnangagwa loyalists have tried, unsuccessfully so far, to sidestep: whether the president’s term can be extended without seeking the direct consent of the people of Zimbabwe through a national referendum.
The Constitution is unambiguous on this matter, both in letter and in spirit.
Section 95(1) sets the presidential term at five years, while section 95(2) limits a person to two terms as President, whether those terms are consecutive or not.
These provisions are not standalone clauses that can be selectively tweaked for political convenience; they define the very substance of the presidency as a time-bound and limited office.
Yet, some Mnangagwa loyalists have attempted to advance a superficially clever but constitutionally hollow argument — that it is possible to extend only the length of a presidential term, without extending the number of terms, and thereby avoid both a referendum and accusations of entrenchment.
This argument collapses under even minimal scrutiny.
Extending the length of a term fundamentally alters the tenure of the presidency.
A two-term presidency of five years each is constitutionally different from a two-term presidency of seven years each.
To pretend otherwise is to elevate semantics over substance.
The Constitution is concerned with the effect of an amendment, not the linguistic gymnastics used to disguise it.
Any measure that prolongs the period a president remains in office beyond what voters originally sanctioned amounts, in substance, to an extension of presidential tenure.
Equally untenable is the suggestion that President Mnangagwa’s stay in office can be prolonged simply by postponing the 2028 elections to 2030 without formally amending term limits.
This, too, is constitutionally indefensible.
Under section 91(2) of the Constitution, the President assumes office after being elected, and under section 95(1), that mandate lasts for five years from the date the President-elect is sworn in.
Once that five-year period expires, the President’s authority lapses.
There is no constitutional mechanism that allows an incumbent to continue governing beyond the expiry of that mandate.
Postponing elections does not suspend the Constitution or freeze presidential term limits; it has the direct effect of extending tenure, which triggers section 328(7) and the need for a national referendum.
The Constitution is concerned with the effect, not the method, and any attempt to govern beyond a lawful term by delaying elections is simply unconstitutional.
That is precisely why Section 328 exists.
Section 328 sets out the procedure for constitutional amendments, and critically, subsection (7) stipulates that if an amendment relates to term limits or the extension of office of the President, it must be approved by a national referendum.
This requirement is triggered not only by changes to the number of terms, but by any change that extends the time the President may remain in office.
This is not optional.
It is mandatory.
Even more inconvenient for those pushing the 2030 agenda is Section 328(6), which expressly states that amendments extending the length of a term of office do not apply to the incumbent unless the amendment itself is approved by a referendum.
This provision was deliberately designed to block precisely the manoeuvre now being contemplated — changing the rules mid-game so that the sitting president benefits.
In other words, even if Parliament were to pass an amendment extending the presidential term from five to seven years, President Mnangagwa could not benefit from it unless Zimbabweans explicitly sanctioned that outcome in a referendum.
This makes it constitutionally impossible to extend only the length of the term while shielding the incumbent from popular approval.
This is why, if Mnangagwa is to remain in office beyond 2028, at least two national referendums would be required: one to extend the presidential term, and another to allow the incumbent to benefit from that extension.
Attempts by ZANU-PF officials to argue that a referendum is not a form of public participation recognised by the Constitution are disingenuous.
The Constitution recognises public hearings and parliamentary processes, yes, but it also reserves certain fundamental changes — particularly those affecting the presidency — for direct approval by the people.
This safeguard exists precisely to prevent incumbents from manipulating parliamentary arithmetic to entrench themselves in power.
The frantic search for a constitutional loophole to avoid a referendum likely explains why the promised draft amendments failed to see the light of day by the end of 2025.
ZANU-PF knows that, no matter how it spins the process, there is no escaping the ultimate authority of the people of Zimbabwe on this issue.
The Constitution was deliberately designed that way.
What makes this avoidance even more curious is the confidence routinely expressed by Mnangagwa loyalists that more than 80% of Zimbabweans supposedly support the president remaining in power beyond 2028.
If this claim were true, a national referendum should be the least of their worries.
Constitutional amendments require only a simple majority — 50% plus one — to pass in a referendum.
With such overwhelming public backing, as claimed, the outcome should be a foregone conclusion.
So why fear a national referendum?
Instead, the real headache for Mnangagwa’s camp lies elsewhere: Parliament.
While ZANU-PF technically enjoys a two-thirds majority in both Houses, constitutional amendments require not just numerical dominance, but political cohesion.
That cohesion is conspicuously absent.
The ruling party is deeply divided, with one camp aligned to Mnangagwa and another rallying around Vice President Constantino Chiwenga, who is widely seen as the natural successor under the current constitutional order.
Even if the numbers exist on paper, there is no guarantee that all ZANU-PF legislators will toe the line on an issue as consequential and polarising as extending Mnangagwa’s tenure.
Quiet dissent, abstentions, or strategic absences could easily derail the amendments.
The risk of failure in Parliament is very real, and a failed vote would be a humiliating blow to the president’s authority.
Beyond the Mnangagwa-Chiwenga fault line lies an even more volatile and less discussed danger: the ambitions of powerful individuals within the president’s inner circle.
Figures such as tenderpreneurs Kudakwashe Tagwirei and Paul Tungwarara have risen meteorically within ZANU-PF, largely on the back of their proximity to Mnangagwa and their access to lucrative public tenders and state assets.
Their wealth has enabled them to dispense patronage on a scale that buys loyalty and visibility within party structures.
At first glance, these men appear to be staunch Mnangagwa loyalists.
Yet politics, especially Zimbabwean politics, is notoriously fickle and unforgiving.
Rapid ascension breeds ambition.
Surrounded by sycophants and buoyed by the illusion of popularity created through handouts, such individuals may begin to believe that they are bigger than the system itself — and even bigger than the president.
From their perspective, why should Mnangagwa remain in office for another two years beyond 2028, occupying space they may now feel entitled to claim?
Why wait until tomorrow when political fortunes can change overnight?
Today’s blue-eyed boys can just as easily be discarded for someone else tomorrow.
In such an unpredictable environment, striking while the iron is hot is often seen as the rational choice.
This creates a perilous situation for Mnangagwa.
He is no longer merely navigating constitutional hurdles; he is contending with competing ambitions, shifting loyalties, and shadowy power plays from within his own camp.
The attempt to extend his term has opened a Pandora’s box of intrigue, rivalry, and instability.
Ultimately, the 2030 agenda is not just legally shaky; it is politically reckless.
It undermines constitutionalism, deepens divisions within ZANU-PF, and risks triggering unpredictable internal rebellions.
Rather than consolidating Mnangagwa’s legacy, it threatens to define it by uncertainty and discord.
The wisest course of action would be for President Mnangagwa to put an immediate and unequivocal end to these manoeuvres.
By publicly and firmly committing to stepping down at the end of his term in 2028, he would not only uphold the Constitution he claims to respect, but also stabilise his party and the country.
Anything less leaves Zimbabwe on a dangerous path — one riddled with legal hurdles, hidden traps, and enemies closer than he may realise.
TENDAI RUBEN MBOFANA - THE UN-OPPRESSED MIND! 